Keyr keeps every API key and secret in one encrypted vault on your own machine — and lends them to your tools only while they run. Then they lock themselves away.
Injected 1 secret(s) into the child process environment.
# the key lives in memory while the tool runs — never on disk in plaintext
Where keys live today
A note-taking app, or a message to yourself
A plaintext "apiKey" in a config file — synced, backed up, indexed
Pasted into code, then committed
Not carelessness — simply no proper place existed.
What one vault changes
Encrypted at rest — AES-256-GCM, scrypt-stretched passphrase
In use, keys live in process memory only
When the process exits, nothing remains to steal
The vault file itself is unreadable without your passphrase.
Four things, done deliberately
That is the whole feature list.
AES-256-GCM + scrypt
Node's built-in crypto: authenticated encryption, memory-hard key derivation, random salt, fresh IV on every write. No GPG, no system packages.
Single-file vault
Everything lives in ~/.keyr/vault.json. Back it up like any file; delete it to start over.
keyr run
Launch any command with secrets injected as environment variables. Tools that read {env:VAR} never need the real value on disk.
TUI + scriptable
An interactive menu for daily use; direct commands and KEYR_PASSPHRASE for automation. Passphrases are always prompted masked — never CLI arguments.
Open, lend, lock
The entire workflow.
Create the vault
keyr init — choose a passphrase. It is never stored; it cannot be recovered, and that is the point.
Store secrets
keyr set HIVE_API_KEY — values are masked on input, encrypted, then written to the single vault file.
Run your tools
" data-id="keyr run opencode — secret masuk ke environment proses anak. Config menunjuk nama, bukan nilai: \"apiKey\": \"{env:HIVE_API_KEY}\"">keyr run opencode — secrets enter the child process's environment. Configs point at names, not values: "apiKey": "{env:HIVE_API_KEY}"
How it compares
Established tools exist. Keyr is a specific trade-off — and choosing another tool is a fine outcome.
Tool
The trade-off
pass / gopass
Battle-tested, but requires GPG (painful on Windows) and spreads one file per secret across a tree.
Bitwarden CLI
Needs a server (cloud or self-hosted) and an account.
1Password CLI
Great env injection — but paid, cloud, account.
Infisical / Doppler
Built for teams; heavy for personal secrets.
age / sops
Encrypt files, but are not managers — no list/set/get or TUI.
Keyr
Node-native (no GPG), single-file vault, keyr run injection, zero accounts. Local-only by design.
Honest questions
Including the ones with uncomfortable answers.
Is the vault safe if someone copies it?
Yes, within the limits of your passphrase. AES-256-GCM plus scrypt makes guessing expensive — a long passphrase is what makes it truly strong.
Does this protect me from malware on my machine?
No. Any process running as your user can read a child's environment or capture keystrokes. Keyr removes secrets from permanent storage on disk — it does not defend against active compromise. No local tool honestly can.
Where is my data sent?
Nowhere. Keyr has no network code at all — no telemetry, no update checks, no sync.
What if I forget the passphrase?
The secrets are gone. There is no recovery — by design. keyr reset deletes the vault so you can start over.